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CONTRACTS FOR A THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY: 
A BRIEF SKETCH 
FROM THE CORPUS IURIS TO PRESENT-DAY CIVIL LAW 
Jan Hallebeek∗ 
1 Introduction 
Contemporary jurisdictions of continental Europe are familiar with the legal 
concepts of a contract in favour of a third-party beneficiary who is not present 
when the contract is entered into as well as the right of this third party to 
enforce such a contract. However, these concepts are not easily compatible 
with the principles of Roman private law.1 The Swiss Legislation on Obligations 
(Schweizerische Obligationenrecht) of 1881 was the first to accept the third 
party contract (art 112 aOR), followed by the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch) of 1900 (§§ 328ff BGB). In the Netherlands it was introduced only 
in 1992, that is when the sixth book of the present Civil Code (Burgerlijk 
Wetboek) acquired force of law, while in the French Code Civil it is still lacking. 
In contemporary legal practice the contract in favour of a third party has wide 
application. In contracts of transport, for instance, one can stipulate a right to 
delivery of the goods to the addressee. An association can obtain rights for its 
members, such as a discount when they buy from a certain company. In labour 
contracts employees can stipulate, among others, payments of the pensions of 
widows and orphans. In all such cases the third party, although not a party to 
the contract, has a claim to enforce what is stipulated. As the concept of a 
third-party beneficiary was not known as such in Roman law, it is of importance 
to see how and why this developed within the civilian tradition. First we will 
investigate the possibility of stipulating for an absent person in Roman law and, 
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1  In contemporary Dutch private law there are various institutions capable of bringing about 
that absent persons acquire contractual rights. The Code of Civil Law allows rights to be 
acquired through an agent. When acting on mandate, such a representative will acquire 
for his principal. The latter will become the creditor in the obligation (art 3:60 BW). 
Secondly, a party to a contract can transfer his contractual claim through assignment to a 
third party. In that case the latter will take his place as creditor in the obligation (art 3:94 
BW). In the third place, there is the contract in favour of a third party. The third will 
acquire a right from the contract entered into in his favour although he is not a party to 
the contract. The Dutch Civil Code merely requires that the third party beneficiary 
accepts the clause in his favour (art 6:253-254 BW). 
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thereafter, the developments in legal scholarship from the Middle Ages, in 
Roman-Dutch law, and some present-day jurisdictions.2 
2 Roman law 
As already stated, Roman law is incompatible with the idea of third-party 
beneficiaries deriving rights from contracts they did not enter into themselves. 
Moreover, as a principal rule of Roman law, the contract in favour of a third 
person has no effect even for the contracting parties. According to Justinian’s 
Institutes it is impossible to stipulate in favour of a third party: alteri stipulari 
nemo potest.3 This rule implies that such a contract, although not prohibited by 
law, simply has no effect. From other texts in the Corpus Iuris Civilis it appears 
that this principle not only applied to the verbal contract of stipulation, but also 
to other contracts, pacts and clauses in favour of an absent beneficiary. At the 
same time, the Institutes acknowledges two exceptions.4 The stipulation in 
favour of a third party is valid in the case where the stipulator has a monetary 
interest in the performance for the third party, for example, when he stipulates 
payment to his creditor in order to fulfil an obligation. The second exception 
exists in the fact that adding a penalty clause renders the stipulatio alteri valid. 
In both cases only the stipulator can invoke the contract. The third party does 
not acquire a right. The Institutes contains yet another maxim which is relevant 
for the issue under discussion, namely the rule that it is impossible to acquire 
anything through an extraneous person, that is someone who is not one’s slave 
or child under paternal control: per extraneam personam nihil adquiri posse.5 
Slaves and children, au contraire, always acquire rights for their fathers and 
masters, irrespective of whether they stipulate for these persons or for 
themselves. Similarly, there are several other situations where an intermediary 
due to a specific legal relationship can acquire a right for one he represents: 
the representative of the local authorities (actor municipum), for example, 
acquires for the municipality, the tutor for his pupil and the curator for one 
confined to his care.6 It is impossible to grant someone such capacity through a 
mandate. As a general rule, a procurator cannot acquire for his principal.7 Only 
the manager of a business undertaking (institor), slave or freeman, can acquire 
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3  Inst  3 19 19. 
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5  Inst 2 9 5. 
6  D 13 5 5 9. 
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79. 
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rights for the owner, his principal.8 These two principal rules, as found in the 
Institutes, are based on an even more fundamental rule of the Roman law of 
contracts, namely that a contract creates a personal bond between parties, 
comparable to the privity of contract which from the nineteenth century until 
recently was the prevailing principle of English common law. The Roman-law 
contract excludes outsiders. Hence, no matter whether we include a pact or 
contractual clause for another or we stipulate for him, our agreement will be 
invalid.9 
However, in the Corpus Iuris a few exceptional cases can be found where the 
third party has the right to enforce the performance stipulated in his favour. 
Apart from some cases where money is lent out in the name of an absent 
person and the latter acquires the right to claim the money back,10 the most 
important of these is the so-called donatio sub modo, the donation under the 
"mode" or "burden" that the donated object will be passed on to a third party 
after a certain lapse of time.11 
3 Medieval legal scholarship 
From the beginning of the twelfth century the Corpus Iuris was studied and 
interpreted, initially maybe as a mere academic occupation. However, the 
underlying perception was always that Roman law is a universal law, suitable 
for practical application. For the Church it soon became the law which could 
serve whenever the sources of Canon law were silent. From the fourteenth 
century the so-called "reception" of Roman law took place in secular litigation, 
starting in Italy and from there spreading over continental Europe. During the 
Middle Ages, the learned jurists interpreted the Roman-law texts in view of 
such applicability, long before Roman law actually started to penetrate into the 
legal practice of the secular courts. In order to enhance its utility and 
acceptability, Roman law was provided with legal dogmatics which were only 
implicitly present in the Roman-law texts or not present at all. Moreover, the 
medieval interpretation of substantive rules of Roman law was frequently at 
odds with the original grammatical significance of the texts. 
The writings of the legal scholars, when interpreting a particular text from the 
Corpus Iuris, do not explain the underlying motives of their innovations. They 
often attempt to substantiate apparent misinterpretations by merely referring to 
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other texts in the Corpus Iuris. Most of the developments in medieval legal 
scholarship, which moved away from the original intention of Justinianic law, 
can be explained by the prevailing social and legal circumstances. Roman law 
was not rediscovered and introduced into a legal vacuum, and altering it by 
"misinterpretation" can often be explained as an attempt to adjust Roman law 
to the existing legal order and, by so doing, rendering it acceptable for practical 
application. The alternative would have been to admit that the Corpus Iuris was 
the legislation of an alien people from a distant past and that much of it should 
be considered as unsuited for the present-day. 
The interpretation of the Roman-law alteri stipulari rule can readily be explained 
against the background of the existing social and legal order at the time when − 
or even before − the study of Roman law commenced. By the end of the Middle 
Ages both the civilians and the canonists, who adopted the Roman alteri 
stipulari rule, considered it possible for contracting parties to stipulate validly 
that something be given or done to a third-party beneficiary and to bring it 
about that this third party could enforce what was stipulated in his favour. We 
will see below what was necessary and which requirements had to be met in 
order to reach this goal. Accepting this possibility certainly did not imply that the 
alteri stipulari rule was put aside. Reconciling the newly-developed doctrine 
with this rule was no easy task, especially for the civilians who had to 
manoeuvre within the boundaries of the Corpus Iuris. Although the medieval 
civilians did not reveal their motives, it could well be that this was an attempt to 
make Roman law in this way more acceptable. In the Middle Ages there was 
no system of law or legal circle that was as hostile to the idea of stipulating for 
a third party as was Roman law. The lex Salica was familiar with the Affatomie, 
the transfer of an entire patrimony to an intermediary as trustee, who at a later 
stage was obliged to pass it on to a third-party beneficiary as indicated by the 
“donor”. In mercantile law there were bills of exchange and bearer instruments. 
Canon law followed the principle that a man should stick to his word and that a 
mere promise is, at least morally, as binding as an oath.12 Almost without 
exception, stipulations in favour of a third party can be found in the Statutes of 
the cities of Northern Italy. 
Although the medieval civilians did not divulge in their writings why they 
intended to develop their doctrines in a certain direction, they did indicate the 
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an absent person through a promise accepted by someone present (C 1 q 7 c 9). 
Whether this present person was regarded as an agent (procurator) or messenger 
(nuntius) of the absent third party, or as a stipulator alteri acting of his own accord, is not 
clear. 
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dogmatic course they took. After the doctrine of the early glossator Martinus († 
after 1157), who generally granted the absent party a remedy to enforce what 
was promised to his benefit,13 had been rejected by the majority of the 
Bolognese glossators, two important innovations may be traced in the Gloss of 
Accursius († 1263). As was stated above, a stipulatio alteri is effective for the 
parties to the stipulation, that is stipulator and promisor, if the first has a 
monetary interest in the performance for the third party. The Institutes does not, 
however, pronounce upon the way the stipulation has to be phrased in order to 
have effect. This is where the Accursian Gloss introduced a specific 
requirement. According to the gloss supra dictum est ad Inst 3 19 19 a 
stipulatio alteri can only be effective when the promise is phrased as addressed 
to the stipulator himself, that is the “me” in the stipulation “Do you promise me 
to give X to Titius?” This has to be explained more fully. In medieval doctrine a 
distinction was drawn between the words of the stipulation indicating to whom a 
performance should take place (the verba executoria) and the words indicating 
to whom the promise was addressed (the verba promissoria). In the event of a 
stipulatio alteri the verba executoria would always mention a third-party 
beneficiary, not the person present. In order to be effective the verba 
promissoria should, at least according to the Accursian Gloss, mention the 
stipulator and not the beneficiary. In other words, the stipulator, having a 
monetary interest in the performance for the third party, was capable of binding 
his promisor, as follows from Inst 3 19 20. However, according to the Accursian 
Gloss this is only if he, the stipulator, formulated the stipulation as addressed to 
himself. Thus, he could effectively stipulate “Do you promise me to give X to 
Titius?”, but it was considered void and without effect when the stipulation was 
phrased as “Do you promise Titius to give him X?”14 The second innovation 
consisted in the fact that where the stipulatio alteri was phrased correctly, as 
explained, with the stipulator himself named as promisee, but the stipulator had 
no actionable interest in the performance for the third party, the stipulation 
would result in a natural obligation between promisor and stipulator.15 The 
stipulatio alteri was not seen as contra legem, prohibited by the law, but only as 
praeter legem, not supported by the law. However, if the stipulatio alteri was 
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14  The gloss supra dictum est ad Inst 3 19 19 also acknowledged the possibility of 
effectively stipulating that something be performed to the stipulator (promisee) as 
recipiens nomine domini mei (“Do you promise me as recipient in the name of my 
principal to ... ?”), which formula actually does not contain a stipulatio alteri, since there 
are no verba executoria directed to a third party who is not present. According to Jean 
Faure and Angelus de Gambilionibus the use of this formula was restricted to procurators 
acting on instructions of their principals and to managers of other people’s affairs. 
15  See the gloss nihil interest ad D 45 1 38 17. 
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phrased incorrectly, namely as addressed to the absent beneficiary, it was 
regarded as entirely invalid, whether the stipulator had an interest or not. The 
underlying reason was probably that such a stipulation was lacking the 
immediate answer of the promisee. 
Canon law was favourably disposed to the idea of binding oneself through a 
promise to someone absent. Being faithful to one’s word implied more than just 
a moral obligation. But how could a unilateral promise to an absent person 
become enforceable? One way was confirming it by oath; another was the 
acceptance by the beneficiary at a later stage. According to Canon law, mere 
consent between parties was sufficient for an agreement to be binding, as 
expressed in the famous maxim pacta sunt servanda (X 1 35 1). Canon law 
was not familiar with such formalities as the presence of the parties and the 
question and answer as required for the Roman-law stipulation. Nevertheless, 
where the promise to perform something for an absent beneficiary was 
accepted by someone present, the canonists were inclined to interpret such a 
promise with reference to the Roman-law stipulatio alteri. They even adopted 
into Canon law the rule that in principle the stipulatio alteri has no effect, 
probably because it was not confirmed by oath or accepted by the beneficiary. 
As did the civilians, the canonists rejected the idea that contractual rights can 
be acquired through the acceptance of someone’s agent (procurator).16 
Together with the alteri stipulari rule from the Institutes, later canonists also 
adopted important elements from the medieval civilian doctrine. They adopted 
the distinction between the stipulatio alteri addressed to the third party and the 
one addressed to the stipulator who was present.17 As in the Accursian Gloss, 
the canonists considered the promise to perform for someone who was not 
present and which was also addressed to this beneficiary himself as having no 
effect, albeit for an entirely different reason. Unlike the Roman-law stipulation, 
Canon law did not require an immediate acceptance by the promisee. 
However, in order to become enforceable acceptance had to take place. As 
long as the beneficiary had not accepted or ratified the promise, there was no 
consent between promisor and promisee and thus no binding force. The 
canonists adopted from the civilians the idea that, when the promisee (the 
person present to whom the stipulatio alteri was addressed) had no monetary 
interest in the performance for the third party, the stipulatio alteri would result in 
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a natural obligation between promisor and promisee. As a consequence this 
promisee could bring no action against the promisor in the event of non-
performance. However, from this point Canon law went some steps further. 
According to a number of canonists the promisor was also bound towards the 
third-party beneficiary through a natural obligation irrespective of whether the 
stipulator had an interest or not.18 As in Roman law, a natural obligation could 
not be enforced by suing the promisor by means of an action. In Canon law 
there had been, however, other means to enforce what was promised. Thus, in 
a specific procedure, the denuntiatio evangelica, the one who accepted the 
promise and (according to some canonists) also the third-party beneficiary 
could bring a complaint against the promisor, stating that the latter did not 
abide by his word and did not act as he had promised. Because of canonical 
equity (equitas canonica) the promise, although only resulting in a natural 
obligation, could be enforced before an ecclesiastical court.19 
Because the civilians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had to manoeuvre 
within the boundaries of the Corpus Iuris, they reached the same goal albeit 
through a much more complicated and sophisticated line of reasoning. Where a 
stipulator had no interest in the performance for the third party (and provided the 
stipulatio alteri was phrased correctly), the promisor first had to confirm the 
promise by oath in order to render the natural obligation into a civil obligation. 
However, in such a case only the stipulator acquired a right, just as in the case 
where he had an interest. Then, the next step would be that the stipulator should 
assign his action to the third party as his procedural representative.20 These two 
steps, confirming the stipulation by oath and assigning the action, were, in terms 
of Canon law, redundant. 
The idea that adapting Roman law to the existing legal order may indeed have 
lain at the root of the developments in medieval civilian doctrine, is endorsed by 
what happened on the Iberian Peninsula. An early reception of Roman law 
through the Siete Partidas (1265) of King Alphonse X the Wise (1221-1284), 
introduced into Castile a law of contract containing all the Roman-law features. 
It was adverse to commercial intercourse and incompatible with the fundamental 
principle that one must keep one’s word. It was thus a closed system of 
contracts, with formalities required for written contracts, real contracts and for 
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the stipulation, and the exclusion of outsiders as implied by the alteri stipulari 
rule. But in 1348, the Ordenamiento de Alcalá of King Alphonse XI (1311-
1350), with one stroke of the pen, replaced these restrictions by a new rule. 
According to the ley Paresciendo (c 29 of the Ordenamiento de Alcalá), one 
can bind oneself to an absent party as long as one has the serious intention to 
enter into a contract with this person. How exactly such a contract between 
absent parties was supposed to have come into existence, was not stated. It 
was clear, however, that a promisor could no longer raise as a defence that he 
“had obliged himself to one person, to give something or to do something for 
another person” (o que se obligó a vno de dar ode fazer alguna cosa aotro), 
which words could be seen as disregarding the Roman alteri stipulari rule. 
4 Early modern doctrine 
In the sixteenth century, particularly on the Iberian Peninsula, new rules were 
developed concerning a promise accepted by someone who was present but 
which related to someone who was absent. This is not surprising. In Spain the 
ley Paresciendo still prevailed. On the one hand this law was very clear 
regarding the fact that one could bind oneself in an informal way to an absent 
party, including through a promise accepted by someone present. On the other 
hand, in many other respects the rule was unclear: What justified the fact that 
the promisor is bound? What was the role of the person present and his 
acceptance of the promise? Was it necessary that the promise had to be 
accepted by the third party at a later stage? The new doctrines were formulated 
in line with the interpretation of the ley Paresciendo and were thus not without 
practical significance. Moreover, from the beginning of the seventeenth century 
these new doctrines started to influence the theories of Natural law in Northern 
Europe. Especially the teachings of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) on the issue 
would be difficult to understand if the writings of the Spanish jurists of the 
previous century were to be disregarded. 
Spanish doctrines did not only derive from the ley Paresciendo. They also 
contained materials derived from various legal traditions. In fact, some 
principles underlying the ley Paresciendo itself played a part, such as the idea 
that a contract can be concluded by the subsequent acceptance of an earlier 
offer. In its turn, the binding force of mere consent between parties with a 
serious intention to be obligated could be seen as a victory of the Canon-law 
principle of pacta sunt servanda over the restricted Roman-law system of 
contracts overburdened by formalities. By the sixteenth century such a stand 
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was no longer an exception. In 1536 the Parlement de Paris acknowledged that 
contracts can be validly concluded by letter.21 According to early modern 
writers in Northern Europe it was an accepted rule of legal practice that nude 
agreements could be enforced. The formalities of Roman law were regarded as 
derogated and it was no longer necessary for parties to come together, as had 
been compulsory for the Roman-law stipulation. All contracts could henceforth 
be concluded through consent and the offer of one party could be accepted by 
the other party at a later stage, provided the offer was not revoked. The fact 
that the absent party was allowed to accept the promise at a later stage and by 
so doing to enter into the contract, put the person present who had accepted 
the promise in a different light. It was no longer necessary that he acquired an 
action himself which he could assign to the third-party beneficiary and it was 
consequently no longer necessary that he had a monetary interest in the 
performance for the third party or that the promise was phrased as being 
addressed to him. But if the third-party beneficiary could himself accept the 
promise, what would be the effect of someone else having done this 
previously? A similar question was discussed by late-medieval civilians when 
interpreting the donatio sub modo (C 8 54(55) 3). They considered the 
acceptance by a donee, by a notary, or by someone else in the name of the 
third-party beneficiary in some cases as making the promise irrevocable. When 
the promise was accepted in the name of the Church, for example, the mode 
could no longer be withdrawn. The Church was supposed to have entered into 
the contract through an agent.22 
Yet another element with its roots in medieval civilian scholarship was still 
clearly present in the teachings of the sixteenth-century Spanish writers, 
namely the distinction between verba promissoria naming the third-party 
beneficiary and verba promissoria naming the person present to accept the 
promise. However, unlike the Gloss of Accursius, the first kind of phrasing was 
no longer regarded as rendering the stipulation void and without effect. In view 
of the circumstances of the time, this is obvious. For a valid stipulation Roman 
law required that the stipulator’s question be followed directly by the promisor’s 
answer, but according to Canon law and the ley Paresciendo a promise could 
be accepted at a later stage. Thus, when the verba promissoria named the 
absent beneficiary (“do you promise Titius to give him X?”), the promise was no 
longer considered to be void and without effect. The ley Paresciendo explicitly 
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ruled that the promisor could not raise as a defence that the promise “was 
made between absent persons in the presence of a public clerk or someone 
else, a private person, in the name of the other” (oque fue fecha aescriuano 
publico oaotra persona priuada en nonbre de otro entre absentes). It has to be 
established, however, what the effect is of such acceptance by someone 
present who was not named explicitly in the wording of the promise as the 
promisee, and, moreover, whether the third-party beneficiary has to accept the 
promise in order to render it enforceable. According to Antonio Gómez (1501-
1562/1572), a jurist from Salamanca, the unilateral promise is in itself binding, 
as was the Roman pollicitatio. As a consequence, acceptance by the person 
present and acceptance by the third-party beneficiary are not relevant for the 
enforceability of the promise. It may well be that pronouncing the promise in the 
presence of a recipient demonstrates the serious intentions of the promisor, but 
from that moment, that is, from the moment the promise was made, the third-
party beneficiary will have a direct action to enforce it.23 Diego de Covarrubias 
y Leyva (1512-1577), a Salamancan law professor who later became bishop of 
Segovia, was of a different opinion. Acceptance by someone present, who was 
not named as promisee in the wording of the promise, makes the promise 
formulated as addressed to an absent beneficiary irrevocable, but it becomes 
enforceable only through acceptance by the beneficiary himself. The underlying 
idea must have been that it is the consent between promisor and beneficiary 
which results in a civil obligation and not the unilateral promise itself. 
Consequently, the question whether the person present who accepts has a 
monetary interest, became irrelevant. This line of reasoning seems to be in 
conformity with the principle as expressed in Canon law, in the ley Paresciendo 
and in other sources of indigenous law, namely that promises can be accepted 
at a later stage.24 
In cases where the verba promissoria referred to the person present to accept 
the promise as the promisee (“do you promise me to give X to Titius?”), the 
promise had a different effect. When discussing this wording, Gómez confined 
himself to those cases where the promisee is the beneficiary’s procurator or the 
manager of his affairs. This is, in fact, the case the ley Paresciendo referred to 
when stating that a promise “was made between absent persons in the 
presence of … a private person in the name of the other”.25 According to 
                                                    
23  Gomezius Variae Resolutiones 2 11 18. 
24  Covarruvias Variarum Resolutionum Juridicarum ex Jure Pontificio, Regio et Caesareo 
Libri IV 1 14 13. 
25  This wording somehow resembles the specific formula mentioned in the gloss supra 
dictum est ad Inst 3 19 19, intended to be used by procurators and managers of a 
principal’s affairs (“Do you promise me as recipient in the name of my principal to ... ?”), 
although that formula actually does not contain a stipulatio alteri; see n 14 above. 
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Gómez, the promisee will acquire a contractual claim which he can assign to 
the third party. A similar view was defended by Covarrubias, who maintained 
that acceptance of the promise by the third party only implies that the latter is 
prepared to accept the assignment.26 
These and similar teachings, developed in sixteenth-century Spanish 
scholarship, left their traces on the doctrine of Grotius on this issue in the 
second book of his De Iure Belli ac Pacis. Yet, Grotius’ thoughts were original. 
He did not follow the teaching of any specific writer in an uncritical way.27 
Where the verba promissoria named the absent beneficiary (which Grotius did 
not consider being void), he drew a distinction between cases where the 
person present, who accepted the promise, acted with a mandate from the 
principal and those where he acted without such a mandate. Where the 
promise is accepted without a mandate, the person present, not being the 
promisee, acquires no right. Neither does the beneficiary who has not yet 
ratified acceptance of the promise, although the promisor can no longer revoke 
it.28 Where the promise is accepted with a mandate from the principal, the latter 
acquires a right through his "agent", that is the intermediary he has appointed. 
He is presumed to endorse the decision, taken by this agent, and to have 
consented through this agent, a construction which comes close to our present-
day concept of direct representation.29 
In the case where the verba promissoria name the person present to accept 
the promise, this intermediary will acquire the right “to bring it about that the 
right will transfer to the other (the beneficiary), if he also accepts it” (ius 
efficiendi ut ad alterum ius perueniat, si et is acceptet).30 To acquire this right, 
which is not a claim to what is promised to perform for the third party, it is not 
required that the intermediary has a monetary interest of his own. As 
Covarrubias has taught, the promisor cannot revoke this promise after it was 
accepted by the intermediary, but contra Covarrubias this intermediary has the 
                                                    
26  Gomezius Variae Resolutiones 2 11 18; Covarruvias In Caput Quamvis Pactum de 
Regulis Iuris Liber 6 2 4 13. 
27  See Dondorp & Hallebeek “Grotius’ doctrine on adquisitio obligationis per alterum and its 
roots in the legal past of Europe” in Condorelli (ed) “Panta rei” Studi dedicati a Manlio 
Bellomo II (2004) 205-244. 
28  The possibility of ratifying the acceptance afterwards implied that the need for the 
complicated late-medieval way of rendering a stipulatio alteri enforceable diminished: 
here the stipulatio alteri addressed to the stipulator, which resulted in a civil (the stipulator 
has an interest) or natural (the stipulator has no interest) obligation towards this 
stipulator. In such a case the stipulator had a claim (civil obligation) or could acquire a 
claim (when the promisor confirmed the natural obligation by oath) which he could assign 
to the third party. 
29  Grotius De Iure Belli ac Pacis 2 11 18[2]. 
30  Cf Pufendorf De Jure Naturae et Gentium 3 9 5. 
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competence to release the promisor from his promise as long as the 
beneficiary has not yet accepted it. Only through acceptance does the third-
party beneficiary acquire a right to enforce the promise.31 
5 Legal practice: Roman-Dutch law 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, legal practice in the Northern 
Netherlands32 was no longer affected so much by the doctrinal distinction 
between verba promissoria addressed to the absent beneficiary and verba 
promissoria addressed to the one present who accepted the promise. This 
distinction had been rooted in the gloss supra dictum est ad Inst 3 19 19, and 
was adopted by the later canonists. It also played an important role in the 
Spanish doctrines of the sixteenth century and in the teachings of Hugo 
Grotius. In legal practice, however, it was another distinction that became more 
and more important, namely whether the person present to accept the promise 
was the beneficiary’s agent or not. The roots of this distinction may also be 
found in the gloss supra dictum est ad Inst 3 19 19, which ruled it possible to 
stipulate effectively a performance to oneself “as recipient of his principal”. 
Some late medieval jurists33 taught that the use of such formula was restricted 
to procurators acting on the instructions of their principals (agents) and 
managers of other people’s affairs. In early modern times, the distinction 
between agents stipulating for their principals and other persons stipulating for 
third-party beneficiaries on their own initiative, became increasingly relevant. 
Gómez, when discussing the stipulatio alteri addressed to the person present, 
even restricted himself to the case where this person was the beneficiary’s 
procurator or the manager of the latter’s affairs. In contrast, Hugo Grotius drew 
the distinction whether the person present was the beneficiary’s procurator or 
not, within the category of promises addressed to the absent beneficiary and 
not to the one present who accepted it. In legal practice it seemed no longer to 
make much difference to whom the promise was addressed, but the exact 
position of the one present to accept it became increasingly important. When 
he acted in his capacity as his principal’s procurator (agent), the principal would 
acquire a direct claim, that is without any cession of remedies and irrespective 
of the fact whether the procurator had acted in his own or in his principal’s 
name. This was, for example, the rule of the Coutume de Paris (1510, revised 
                                                    
31  Grotius De Iure Belli ac Pacis 2 11 18[1]. 
32  See Hallebeek “Third party contracts in the civilian tradition and in Roman Dutch law” 
1999 The Bar Association LJ (Sri Lanka) 26-37; Hallebeek “Jacob Voorda’s teachings on 
the maxim alteri stipulari nemo potest” in Van den Bergh (ed) Summa Eloquentia; Essays 
in Honour of Margaret Hewett (2002) 117-133; Dondorp & Hallebeek “Het derdenbeding 
bij Voorda en Moltzer” 2002 Pro Memorie  49-67. 
33  These were Jean Faure († ca 1340) and Angelus de Ubaldis (1328-1417). 
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in 1580). A principal can act through his agent and by so doing he himself 
becomes a party to the contract.34 In De Iure Belli ac Pacis Grotius discussed 
this possibility in the case where the promise, accepted by the agent, was 
addressed to the principal, but in France the distinction between the two ways 
in which the verba promissoria could be phrased was seen as a subtlety of 
Roman law. It was accepted that agents could conclude contracts for their 
principals and that the one who acted in his capacity as agent was not 
considered to have stipulated for a third party. It was the principal himself who 
entered into the contract.35 This view was also defended in the Netherlands at 
the end of the eighteenth century, for example, by Dionysius Godefridus van 
der Keessel (1738-1816). When acting through an agent, the principal enters 
into the contract and there is, in such cases, no need to accept the agreement 
– not even when the agent acted in his own name. 
What were the consequences of the promise to someone who was not acting 
as an agent, for example someone stipulating on his own initiative or 
overstepping the boundaries of his mandate that something be given to a third 
party, either in his own interest or out of generosity? In order to answer this 
question, some jurists, such as Hugo Grotius, Arnold Vinnius (1588-1657) and 
Van der Keessel, held to the requirement that the beneficiary must actually 
accept the promise regarding his benefit in order to acquire a remedy. Others, 
such as Simon Groenewegen van der Made (1613-1652), Simon van Leeuwen 
(1625-1682) and Johannes Voet (1647-1713), merely stated that the third-party 
beneficiary acquires an action to enforce what was promised for his benefit and 
did not mention the need to accept the promise or to assign the claim. 
In his Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-geleerdheid Grotius still referred to 
the Roman-law requirement that the person present must either have a 
financial interest in the performance he stipulates for a third party or add a 
penalty clause. These were, however, Roman-law subtleties which were no 
longer observed. We should pay more attention to equity, according to Grotius, 
and the beneficiary should be allowed to accept the promise as long as the 
promisor has not retracted it.36 This view was in conformity with what Grotius in 
later times would write in De Iure Belli ac Pacis. The third party acquires a right 
by accepting the promise at a later stage. That the person present also 
acquires a certain right by his acceptance, namely the right “to bring it about 
that the right will transfer to the other (the beneficiary), if he also accepts it” is a 
                                                    
34  The question whether an agent can also obligate his principal is left aside here. 
35  Domat Les Loix Civiles dans Leur Ordre Naturel, Prem. Partie (Des engagements) 1 116 
and 1 2 4; Pothier Traité des Obligations 1 1 74. 
36  Grotius Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-geleerdheid 3 3 38. 
24   Contracts for a third party beneficiary 
_______________________________________________________________ 
detail that was lacking in the Inleidinge. Both in Grotius’ doctrine and his 
description of Dutch legal practice, there was still room for the alteri stipulari 
rule. On the one hand, a promise that something be given to an absent 
beneficiary, accepted by someone present, not being the beneficiary’s agent, 
can be effective between parties. On the other hand, this effect is not that the 
performance can be enforced (in that respect the alteri stipulari rule was still in 
force!). According to De Iure Belli ac Pacis acceptance by the person present 
makes the promise irrevocable. The third-party beneficiary cannot derive rights 
from such acceptance, only from his own acceptance of the promise. The 
opinion of Grotius was adopted by Vinnius. The third-party beneficiary has to 
accept the promise in order to acquire an action unless the person present who 
accepted the promise first was a notary.37 The same rule can be found in Van 
der Keessel, who explicitly rejected the opinions of Groenewegen and Voet. 
According to Van der Keessel both Grotius’ opinion and his own are not based 
on the subtleties of civil law, but they are in conformity with nature, which 
cannot be put aside by deviating legal practice.38 
In the works of other “old authorities” of Roman-Dutch law, the alteri stipulari 
rule seems to have lost much of its practical significance. These writers no 
longer required acceptance of the promise by the beneficiary. It appears that 
the stipulatio alteri itself is sufficient to obligate the promisor towards the third 
party. At least this is the implication of the statements on the issue by Simon 
Groenewegen, Simon van Leeuwen and Johannes Voet. The stipulatio alteri 
simply results in the acquisition of an obligation and a remedy. A monetary 
interest of the stipulator in the performance for the third party is not required for 
such an effect. An affective interest also suffices. Almost in every instance 
there will be a monetary or an affective interest. A man is not so stupid 
(demens), Groenewegen maintained, as to stipulate for another unless he 
thinks that he has an interest himself.39 Other jurists, such as Paulus Voet 
(1619-1667), explicitly accepted generosity as a valid underlying motive for the 
stipulatio alteri.40 These writers did not require, as did Grotius, Vinnius and Van 
der Keessel, that the third party accepts the promise to his benefit or that the 
                                                    
37  Vinnius In Quatuor Libros Institutionum Commentarius Academicus et Forensis ad Inst 3 
19 4 n 3. 
38  Van der Keessel Theses Selectae Iuris Hollandici et Zelandici 510. Acceptance by the 
third party as a requirement for making the promise enforceable is an element which can 
still be found in some of the present-day codifications of civil law, such as the Dutch Civil 
Code of 1992 (art 6:253-254 BW). 
39  Reference is made here to D 18 7 7. See Groenewegen De Legibus Abrogatis ad Inst 3 
20 19 n 3; cf also Groenewegen ad D 41 2 49 2; Leeuwen Censura Forensis 4 16 8; and 
Johannes Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas ad D 45 1 n 3. 
40  Paulus Voet In Quattuor Libros Institutionum Commentarius ad Inst 3 19 18. 
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person who accepted the promise assigns his remedy to the third party, as was 
necessary in the traditional ius commune. 
However, in Roman-Dutch law, the acquisition of a claim by the third party 
without assignment was not beyond dispute as appears from a case from the 
year 1733 which was recorded by Cornelis van Bijnkershoek (1673-1743).41 
Eventually the High Court (Hoge Raad) of Holland and Zeeland granted the 
third party a claim, but it was seriously questioned whether this was possible 
since the stipulator had not assigned his remedy. Apparently here the third 
party’s claim was directly derived from the agreement to his benefit, although 
he had not entered into it. A similar effect of the stipulatio alteri can be found in 
the law of Scotland as described by Stair (James Dalrymple, 1619-1695).42 
It was not easy, though, to reconcile such a legal concept with the traditional 
doctrines on the sources of obligation. Most of the writers did not even attempt 
to do this. Of the few who did, it was Groenewegen who qualified the stipulatio 
alteri as a nude pact (pactum nudum) in relationship to the third party and 
according to contemporary legal practice nude pacts were enforceable. 
However, nude pacts require consent between parties and there can be no 
consent between promisor and absent beneficiary as long as the latter has not 
yet accepted the promise. In the case just referred to, the High Court justified 
its decision by analogy with comparable situations, where according to Roman-
Dutch law the third party beyond doubt has a remedy at his disposal: the 
intermediary had assigned his remedy to him or the contract was entered into 
by the manager of his affairs or his agent.43 
6 The codifications of civil law 
Not only in the Netherlands was the alteri stipulari rule for the greater part 
undermined or disregarded. Meanwhile, also in the usus modernus of the 
German territories it had been accepted that one can stipulate for a third party 
and that this third party can enforce what was stipulated in his favour. This did 
not mean, however, that the role of the Roman-law alteri stipulari rule was 
once-and-for-all played out in Europe. In the nineteenth century it was, au 
contraire, notably present in legal doctrine. Two important factors were 
responsible for this, namely the French Civil Code (Code Civil) of 1804, which 
was introduced not only into many other countries and regions but also served 
                                                    
41  Observationes Tumultuariae 2792. 
42  Institutions of the Law of Scotland (1693) 1 10 5. 
43  Deriving a claim directly from the contract made by others in one’s favour is a feature 
which is still characteristic of the concept of third party contracts in the present-day 
codifications of civil law, such as the German Civil Code of 1992 (§ 328 BGB). 
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as an example for several other European Codes of Civil Law, and the German 
Historical School (Historische Schule). As regards contracts in favour of a third 
party the French Civil Code mainly relied on the Traité des Obligations (1761) 
of Robert-Joseph Pothier (1699-1772). In this work, Pothier, the last great jurist 
of the ancient regime and also called the père du Code Civil, described the old 
French law of obligations, although using his own framework and with distinct 
influences of Roman law. In the mid-nineteenth century, the writers of the 
Historical School in Germany returned to Roman law and its alteri stipulari rule. 
Consequently both the requirement that the stipulator must have an interest for 
the stipulatio alteri to be effective, and the requirement that the third-party 
beneficiary can only acquire a remedy through assignment by the stipulator 
retained an actual significance in legal doctrine. 
However, with the progress of the nineteenth century these two requirements 
were seen as undesirable in view of the increasing social importance of life 
assurances. The Industrial Revolution had dramatically changed the sources of 
income of a major part of the population and hence the means to look after the 
well-being of surviving relatives. The latter was no longer secured by family 
property. Life assurances took the form of contracts in favour of a third party, 
but the requirements mentioned above caused at least two problems. First, it 
was questionable whether a contract of life assurance was effective since the 
assured person himself seems to have no monetary interest in the beneficiary 
clause. For this reason it was, in 1888, accepted in French case law that a 
moral interest (profit moral) suffices.44 Secondly, it was disputed whether it was 
only the assured person himself or also the beneficiary who could derive rights 
from the contract. If the first was the case, the claim against the assurance 
company would be part of the inheritance. Then the beneficiaries would be 
dependent on the cooperation of the heirs (if they themselves were not heirs of 
the assured person) and have to pay succession taxes. Moreover, as long as 
life assurances were not explicitly provided for by the lawgiver and could only 
be qualified as contracts in favour of a third party, other questions also 
remained unsolved. Does a life assurance have to be accepted by the 
beneficiary? Is a life assurance irrevocable? Does the claim against the 
assurance company belong to the assured person’s estate in case of his 
bankruptcy? 
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6 1 France 
Due to the influence of Pothier’s Traité des Obligations, the alteri stipulari rule 
was embodied in the French Code Civil, that is in article 1119 CC, but not 
phrased negatively – nobody can stipulate for another – but positively and 
more encompassing: one can only bind oneself and stipulate for oneself (pour 
soi-même). And yet the Roman rule did not revive to its full extent. Pothier had 
already drawn a distinction between stipulating in one’s own name and 
stipulating in the name of a third party. The latter he regarded as agency and 
he no longer questioned the possibility that in such a way, namely through an 
agent as intermediary, the absent person can conclude a contract and by so 
doing acquire contractual rights. This was also accepted in the Code Civil and 
thus article 1119 CC only referred to stipulating for the benefit of a third party in 
one’s own name. For such a stipulation, article 1119 CC required that it takes 
place for oneself (pour soi-même). These words were not just seen as a 
modern equivalent of the monetary interest mentioned in the Institutes of 
Justinian. Pothier had already taught that this interest not only exists when one 
stipulates the payment of a certain amount for his creditor, but also when a 
manager of another’s affairs stipulates a performance for his principal. After all, 
the fact that the manager is liable towards his principal by reason of the 
unauthorized administration can be seen as a financial interest.45 It was, 
however, disputed amongst the later French writers whether the management 
of another’s affairs had to have commenced previously. Was a pre-existing 
interest required, or would it suffice when the interest came into being through 
the stipulation for the benefit of the principal? In French legal doctrine Pothier’s 
ideas were developed further. Also by adding a penalty clause the stipulatio 
alteri was entered into for oneself. In fact, only when it was impossible to 
construe some kind of interest, for example when stipulating for a third party 
took place out of mere generosity, the beneficiary clause was still void under 
article 1119 CC. There were, however, also jurists in France who in such a 
case nevertheless presumed the stipulator to be the manager of the 
beneficiary’s affairs. Later in the nineteenth century (1888), it was accepted in 
case law that the stipulator’s interest as required by article 1119 CC could also 
be a moral interest. 
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Given the fact that this wide interpretation of the interest requirement had 
almost entirely eroded the alteri stipulari rule, it must be considered in which 
cases the third party had a remedy at his disposal. It is striking that most of the 
French writers did not discuss this question in their commentaries on article 
1119 CC. Some of them followed the tradition of the older ius commune and 
maintained that it is the stipulator who acquires a remedy which he has to 
assign to the beneficiary. Others, such as Léobon Larombière (1813-1893), the 
first president of the Court of Appeal in Paris, followed the doctrines of Natural 
law and maintained that the beneficiary could only sue the promisor after 
accepting the promise.46 In order to answer the question whether the third party 
acquires a remedy and if so exactly at which moment, there are other 
provisions of the Code Civil which must be taken into account. Article 1165 CC 
rules that a contract cannot impose burdens upon a third party, nor can it 
confer benefits on him except in the two cases mentioned in article 1121 CC. 
The latter states that one can stipulate for a third party when this is the 
condition of something one stipulates for oneself or the condition of a donation. 
The first exception is reminiscent of the Roman-law interest requirement. Every 
performance stipulated as owed to the stipulator himself and not to the third 
party was considered to be such a stipulation “for oneself”, including a 
contractual penalty. The second exception echoes the Roman-law donatio sub 
modo. The word "donation" of article 1121 CC was interpreted extensively. It 
included not just gifts, but any alienation and, moreover, in later times also any 
quid pro quo in return for the performance for the third party, such as, for 
example, the payment of a premium to an assurance company. As a 
consequence of this interpretation, the alteri stipulari rule of article 1119 CC 
became a dead letter. In almost all cases the contract in favour of a third 
person is valid, while in only a small number of cases the stipulator still has to 
assign his remedy to the beneficiary. 
6 2 The Netherlands 
The teachings of the authorities of Roman-Dutch law may have lived on in 
South Africa, but not in the Netherlands. As regards contracts in favour of a 
third party, the Civil Code of 1838 followed the French Code Civil which had 
been in force in the Netherlands since 1811. The rule that one can only bind 
oneself or stipulate for oneself (art 1119 CC) can be found in article 1351 Oud 
Burgerlijk Wetboek (OBW), the two exceptional cases, where a contract can 
confer benefits to a third party (art 1121 CC) can be found in article 1353 OBW. 
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It was in particular Jacob Pieter Moltzer (1850-1907), in later years Professor of 
private law at the University of Amsterdam, who in 1876 in his doctoral thesis 
strongly argued in favour of the position of third-party beneficiaries. In his 
opinion the contract in favour of a third party will always result in an obligation 
between promisor and stipulator, but between promisor and third-party 
beneficiary only when one of the two requirements of article 1353 OBW is met. 
But how should we interpret the words from this provision that the beneficiary 
clause is a condition of “something one stipulates for oneself” (een beding, 
hetwelk men voor zich zelven maakt)? Referring to the genesis of the 
corresponding article in the French Code Civil, Molzter maintained that this 
clause could be any agreement between stipulator and promisor, not just 
something for the benefit of the stipulator (eg a contractual fine), as was the 
prevailing opinion in French and Dutch case law at the time. Thus, the 
stipulator could also make a promise in return for the performance he stipulated 
for the third party. In such a case this third-party beneficiary would acquire an 
enforceable right. The clause itself grants the third party such a right and 
Moltzer considered the unilateral expression of the promisor’s will to be the 
source of the obligation (such as the Roman pollicitatio). Acceptance by the 
stipulator only makes the promise irrevocable.47 In 1905 Eduard Maurits Meijers 
(1880-1954), the later author of the New Dutch Civil Code, defended a different 
view and followed the French case law of the time, requiring that one stipulates 
something to one’s own benefit, apart from stipulating a performance for the third 
party. The mere beneficiary clause would be without effect. It can only be effective 
when it is added to a contract which also grants certain rights to the one who 
stipulates in favour of the third party.48 In 1914 the High Court (Hoge Raad) 
adopted the teachings of Meijers and not those of Moltzer. This leading case 
dealt with a contract between Paul Kruger (1825-1904), president of the Zuid-
Afrikaansche Republiek, and the Zuid-Afrikaansch Museum in Dordrecht. 
Kruger gave certain objects in loan to the museum and stipulated the 
competence to terminate the contract for himself and for a third person after his 
death. This third person was Kruger’s right-hand man Dr Willem Johannes 
Leyds (1859-1940). The High Court considered this contract to be in conformity 
with the requirement of the Civil Code 1838. Kruger had stipulated something 
for himself and he could thus add a competence stipulated for a third party to 
this contract. Leyds was therefore entitled to terminate the loan and claim 
restitution of the objects.49 As a result of this decision, under the former Civil 
                                                    
47  Moltzer De Overeenkomst ten Behoeve van Derden (1876) 318ff and 361ff. 
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Themis  432-436. 
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Code (1838) the stipulation in favour of a third party could never develop into a 
fully emancipated contract, but always had to take the form of a beneficiary 
clause added to another contract in which the contracting party also stipulated 
something in his own favour.50 
6 3 Germany 
In Germany a different development had taken place. In the German territories the 
sources of law varied from state to state. Some had codified private law, some still 
used the French Code Civil, while others applied the uncodified ius commune. 
The jurists of the Historical School attempted to create a common legal doctrine 
based on Roman law for all these territories. In the middle of the nineteenth 
century they returned to the Roman alteri stipulari rule, in the sense that they 
taught that it is impossible to acquire contractual rights through an intermediary. 
Initially, this rule was also regarded as incompatible with the concept of direct 
representation. Soon, however, Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861), the most 
important protagonist of the Historical School, defended the view, which was by 
no means obvious, that direct representation was already acknowledged in 
Roman law.51 For the contract in favour of a third-party beneficiary to be effective, 
this implied that the stipulator had to have an interest of his own in the 
performance for the third party. Moreover, the latter could only acquire a remedy 
through assignment of the stipulator’s claim. In the indigenous law of the German 
territories, there were, however, various legal concepts granting the third-party 
beneficiary a claim of his own without any assignment.52 In order to explain the 
existence of such claims in Roman-law terms, it was necessary to presume that 
assignment had taken place or to regard the Roman-law donatio sub modo as the 
underlying justification. Moreover, case law of the time sometimes presumed that 
the beneficiary had accepted an offer made to him. Apart from reconciling existing 
legal practice with Roman legal theory, there was also serious criticism of the 
alteri stipulari rule. The requirement of interest was seen as incompatible with 
freedom of contract. According to many writers, there were no good reasons to 
justify that the stipulator would not acquire a remedy which he could assign if he 
had stipulated for a third-party beneficiary out of mere generosity. 
                                                                                                                              
1924/71) and that the parties, ie promisor and stipulator, must have the intention that the 
third party will acquire a right of his own. The mere request to the bank to make a 
payment to someone does not grant this person an enforceable right (HR 10-1-1967, NJ 
1967/97). 
50  The contract of life assurance was in the meantime embodied in the Dutch Commercial 
Code. 
51  This was based on a controversial interpretation of D 41 1 53. See Savigny Das 
Obligationenrecht als Theil des heutigen römischen Rechts 2 (1853) 19-20 61-62 71-72. 
52  These were the Erbverträge and bauerliche Gutsabfindungen. 
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The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) of 1900 reflects the teachings 
of one of the most important German jurists of the nineteenth century, Bernhard 
Windscheid (1817-1892), who was a Professor in Leipzig from 1874. In his 
textbook Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts he stated that indigenous German law 
was familiar with many exceptions to the Roman alteri stipulari rule. Initially 
Windscheid explained the existence in legal practice of remedies for the third-
party beneficiary as just described that are based on Roman law. However, in the 
fifth (1879) and later editions of his textbook there is a new dogmatic explanation. 
When the stipulator accepts the promisor’s statement that the latter will do 
something for or give something to an absent beneficiary, the promisor’s will is 
held (festgehalten) by the stipulator. This means that he is no longer capable of 
altering this will.53 Following this view, the first draft of the Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch already stated in general terms that third-party beneficiaries derive a 
right from the contract concluded in their favour if this was the intention of the 
contracting parties. Nowadays, we find the contract in favour of a third-party 
beneficiary in a similar form in § 328 BGB: by means of a contract one can 
stipulate a performance for a third party to the effect that the third party directly 
acquires the competence to enforce the performance. 
7 Actual situation 
Nowadays most European jurisdictions are familiar with the concept of 
contracts in favour of a third-party beneficiary, although in some instances this 
is of recent date. In the Netherlands it was introduced only when the sixth book 
of the present Civil Code came into force (1 January 1992). In 1999 the English 
doctrine of privity of contract, which predominated English common law since 
the nineteenth century, was put aside by the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 
Act 1999. Paragraphs 1(1) and 1(2) of this enactment provide that the 
beneficiary may in his own right enforce a term of the contract if the contract 
expressly provides that he may, or the term purports to confer a benefit on him, 
unless on a proper construction of the contract it appears that the parties did 
not intend the term to be enforceable by the third party. 
The various European jurisdictions, however, still show remarkable differences. 
In some countries, such as France and Belgium, there is no clear statutory 
basis for contracts in favour of a third party. Moreover, there are serious 
differences between the various codes of private law which do acknowledge 
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third-party contracts, and these should not be disregarded. The German 
version of a third-party contract does not require acceptance by the third-party 
beneficiary and, moreover, what this person acquires is a direct claim and not a 
claim presumed to be assigned by the stipulator. History demonstrates that a 
similar concept was already known in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, for example in the writings of Groenewegen, Leeuwen and Johannes 
Voet, and in Stair’s Institutions of the Law of Scotland. Also English law does 
not require acceptance by the third-party beneficiary in order to acquire an 
enforceable right, but parties do have the competence to vary or revoke the 
contract as long as the third-party beneficiary has not yet shown his assent to 
the term in his favour or relied on it to the knowledge of the promisor. The 
Dutch version of a third-party contract (art 6:253 BW) requires acceptance by 
the third-party beneficiary, as does South African case law since the mid-
nineteenth century.54 This time it seems to be the approach of Natural law, as 
previously defended by Roman-Dutch jurists as Grotius, Vinnius and Van der 
Keessel, which rears its head. The requirement of acceptance implies that no 
rights are acquired by the third-party beneficiary and that the promise can be 
revoked as long as acceptance has not yet taken place (art 6:253 lid 2 BW). 
The Dutch Civil Code goes one step further. It states explicitly that after 
accepting the promise, the third-party beneficiary is considered to be a party to 
the contract (art 6:254 BW). In view of this provision it is doubtful whether 
contemporary Dutch law actually accepts the stipulatio alteri as a fully 
developed legal concept. The contract between promisor and stipulator seems 
to exist in no less and no more than an offer to the third party which the latter 
can accept or not. At any rate this version of the third-party contract deviates 
fundamentally from the German one. 
                                                    
54  See also McCullogh v Fernwood Estate Ltd 1920 AD 204 206. 
